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Dedication

John J. McCloy receiving M edal of Honor from AICPA Chairman B. Z. Lee.

John J. McCloy served as chairman of the Public Oversight Board
from its inception in 1977 until his resignation in February 1984 for
personal reasons.
His appointment as member and chairman of the Board brought
immediate stature and credibility not only to the Board, but also to
the accounting profession’s enhanced program of self-regulation.
His leadership contributed materially to the Board’s effectiveness.
He played major guiding roles in formulating and articulating the Board’s
philosophy regarding self-regulation, in determining the Board’s juris
diction, and in formulating and implementing the Board’s operating
policies.
His lasting and significant contribution has made the accounting
profession’s innovative program of self-regulation effective in serving
both the public interest and the profession.
Because of his leadership, wise counsel, and warm friendship, the
members of the Public Oversight Board gratefullv dedicate this report
to him. We are all richer for having the opportunity to serve with him.

PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
----------------------- SEC Practice Section • AICPA------------------------540 Madison Avenue • New York 10022 • (212) 486-2448

June 30, 1984

To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section,
Securities and Exchange Commission, and
Other Interested Parties

It is my pleasure to transmit this sixth annual report of the Public Oversight Board. This report differs
in some material respects from our previous reports.
As my predecessor remarked in his address of May 9, 1983 to the Council of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants:
“Very few persons outside the profession are aware of what the peer review process is
about or what it has accomplished. Several years have been spent getting the Division’s
program in place and functioning. In the past it may have seemed premature to adver
tise a program still being developed. Now we believe the program has reached the stage
at which it can be presented with pride as an accomplished fact.”
We believe all users of financial statements should be aware of the accounting profession’s selfregulatory program and the success it has attained. We hope this report and the accompanying booklet
entitled Audit Quality: The Profession’s Program will give readers a better understanding of how the pro
gram works and an appreciation of its objectives and accomplishments.
This year’s report is dedicated to John J. McCloy, who served as Board chairman from its
inception until his resignation in February 1984. The AICPA acknowledged its gratitude by awarding
him its Medal of Honor for his outstanding leadership as charter member and first chairman of the
Public Oversight Board. Those of us who had the privilege of serving with him recognize that the
award was richly deserved.
The Board believes that firms belonging to the SEC Practice Section continue to give evidence
of strong commitment to self regulation and the improvement of quality of services to their clients.
Very truly yours,

A r t h u r M. W o o d

Chairman

Highlights
Public Oversight B oard Activities
■ Board and staff members actively monitored
all activities of the Section during the past year
by:
□ Attendance at all committee meetings and
a majority of meetings of task forces.
□ Review of all peer reviews completed dur
ing the year.
□ Review of all litigation alleging audit failures
of SEC registrants.
■ The Board is convinced that the self-regulatory
program of the profession is improving the quality
of accounting and auditing practice of its member
firms.
■ The Board has published simultaneously with
the publication of this sixth annual report a booklet
entitled Audit Quality: The Profession’s Program. The
booklet describes how the practice of public ac
counting is regulated at three distinct levels—by
firms individually, by the profession, and by gov
ernment; the elements of a quality control system
of a CPA firm; and the peer review and special
investigative processes of the SEC Practice Sec
tion, integral parts of the accounting profession’s
program of self-regulation. The Board’s oversight
extends primarily to the operation of the SEC
Practice Section.
■ Members of the Board elected Arthur M. Wood
to succeed John J. McCloy as chairman. The Board
has not yet appointed a member to fill the vacancy
created by the resignation of Mr. McCloy.

Peer Review Activities o f the Section
■ One hundred forty-four firms were peer re
viewed in 1983. The reports on all but three reviews
were processed by the Peer Review Committee as
of the date of this report. One hundred thirtythree of the reports processed were unqualified
opinions, seven were qualified, and only one
was adverse.
■ Twenty- three of the firms reviewed in 1983 had
received a modified report on their initial review

in prior years; all but five of these firms received
unqualified opinions on their reviews in 1983.
■ Only one firm received an adverse opinion on
two successive reviews. The Peer Review Com
mittee accepted the latter report on the condition
that the firm agree to undertake significant cor
rective actions imposed by the Committee. Never
theless, the Board expressed its concern to the
Section regarding the extended period of time
over which the firm’s unsatisfactory performance
had been permitted to continue without more
decisive action being taken by the firm. In response,
the Section has notified the firm that proceedings
leading to the possible imposition of a sanction
would begin unless the firm took immediate deci
sive action.
■ Reports on other peer reviews were accepted
by the Peer Review Committee on the condition
that the reviewed firms provide assurance that
they were implementing appropriate corrective
actions by:
□ Allowing the reviewer or a Committee
member to revisit the firm to assess the effec
tiveness of the improvements made.
□ Requiring the firm to make available a
copy of the report on the subsequent inspec
tion of its quality control system.
□ Requiring the firm to engage the services
of a competent person from outside the firm
to perform a preissuance review of all audit
engagements.
■ The Board has suggested several improvements
in the peer review process, which have been acted
upon to the Board’s satisfaction. Two that have
been made recently and not yet acted upon are:
□ A peer review report should make reference
to the letter of comments when such letter is
issued in conjunction with the report.
□ Additional guidance should be provided
to reviewers as to when noncompliance with
the quality control element of inspection
should result in the issuance of a modified
report.

■ Several modifications of peer review standards
and procedures were made during the year, some
of them at the suggestion of the Board. The more
important ones were:
□ A reviewer is now required to consider
litigation alleging audit failure that is required
to be reported to the Section’s Special Inves
tigations Committee by the firm as a factor
in determining the scope of that firm’s forth
coming peer review.
□ Procedures were established to resolve
disagreements between a peer reviewer and
the Peer Review Committee as to the type of
report to be issued on a specific peer review.
□ To serve as a reviewer, a firm must have
had its own quality control system peer
reviewed.
□ Additional information was provided to
reviewers regarding selection of engagements
for review where the firm has received fees
for performance of management advisory
services (MAS) which exceeded fees for audit
services.
□ A reviewed firm is now required to docu
ment the actions it plans to take when a peer
review team concludes that the firm did not
perform sufficient procedures to support an
audit report issued.

Special Investigative Activities o f the Section
■ Twenty-seven cases alleging failure with res
pect to the performance of an audit of the finan
cial statements of an SEC registrant were reported
by member firms during the year. At the begin
ning of the year, the Special Investigations Com
mittee had open files on twenty-five cases reported
in prior years.
■ The Special Investigations Committee deter
mined that no case on its agenda warranted a spe
cial review of a firm’s quality control system in the
current year.
■ Files on all but twenty cases were closed; four
teen cases are still undergoing initial investigative

procedures and six are being monitored awaiting
future developments.
■ The Special Investigations Committee requested
technical committees of the AICPA to consider
whether allegations in reported cases indicate a
deficiency in professional standards or a need for
additional guidance.
□ As a result of meetings with members of
the Committee, the AICPA Banking Com
mittee published additional information
regarding appropriate bank auditing pro
cedures and reassessed the adequacy of its
recently published Bank Audit Guide.
□ The Committee conferred with represen
tatives of the AICPA Insurance Committee
to discuss issues raised in reported cases and
urged the Accounting Standards Executive
Committee to accelerate its consideration of
income recognition issues of certain insurance
industry transactions.

Other Section Activities
■ John W. Zick of Price Waterhouse was elected
chairman of the Executive Committee succeed
ing Ray J. Groves of Ernst & Whinney.
■ A special committee—the SECPS Review Com
mittee—was appointed by the chairman of the
American Institute of Certified Public Account
ants to review the structure, operations, and ef
fectiveness of the Section. The Committee’s report
has been submitted to the AICPA Board of Direc
tors for approval and clearance to publish.
■ Membership in the SEC Practice Section increased
by sixteen firms in the year ended June 30, 1984.
■ Members of the Section audit 85 percent of the
publicly-traded companies listed in the eleventh
edition of Who Audits America; these companies
account for over 98 percent of the combined sales
of all publicly-traded companies.
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Introduction
The SEC Practice Section and the Private Com
panies Practice Section constitute the Division for
CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants. The Division was created in
the fall of 1977 in response to a perceived need for
a more effective self-regulatory program for the
accounting profession. This new innovative struc
ture is concerned with the activities and conduct
of accounting firms as opposed to those of indivi
dual accountants. The Public Oversight Board
oversees the activities of the SEC Practice Section.
This sixth annual report of the Public Over
sight Board describes the activities of the SEC
Practice Section during the period July 1, 1983 to
June 30, 1984.

Clearer Perspective of Self-Regulation
The creation of the Division for CPA Firms
was a milestone in the history of regulation. No
other profession has a self-regulatory program
that is broader in scope or that has had as signifi
cant an impact on the quality of professional
practice.
The program was adopted in part to fore
stall the possibility of increased government
regulation arising from a series of significant busi
ness and alleged audit failures in the 1960s and
1970s. At congressional hearings, concern was
expressed about the manner in which the account
ing profession was being regulated and dis
ciplined. Some congressional leaders suggested
that Congress should enact legislation to create a
regulatory organization for accountants similar
to that governing the securities industry.1
Because it was intended in part to preclude
action by Congress, the self-regulatory program
was initially considered by many both within and
outside the profession to be a substitute for
government regulation. However, experience
with the program has convinced the Board that
self-regulation is not and cannot be a substitute

1 O n J u n e 16, 1978, HR 1317 5, A Bill to Establish a National Organiza
tion of Securities and Exchange Accounting Commission, was proposed
but not enacted.

for government regulation. Self-regulation, or
perhaps more properly, peer regulation, is but
one of three distinct levels of regulation of the
activities of accountants in public practice. In
addition to being regulated by peers, practicing
public accountants are regulated by their firms
and by various governmental agencies. The methods
and objectives of these three levels of regulation
governing the practice of public accounting are
more fully described in an article authored by
Board member Robert K. Mautz, which appeared
in the April 1984 issue of the Journal ofAccountancy
and is reproduced as Exhibit I.
The Board has published a booklet Audit
Quality: The Profession's Program which serves as a
companion piece to this report. The booklet de
scribes in greater detail the structure and prin
cipal activities of the organizations involved in the
regulation of accountants, explains the elements
of a quality control system of a firm in the practice
of public accounting, and describes the SEC Prac
tice Section’s peer review and special investigative
processes.

Activities of the Board
As its name implies, the Board oversees the
activities of the SEC Practice Section. The Board
and its staff represent the public interest in the
Section’s peer regulatory program and actively
monitor all aspects of the program. The Board
does not have line authority and has never sought
such, for it believes that by so doing, it would vio
late the spirit of self-regulation. Notwithstanding
the fact that the Board’s role is one of oversight
only, it has had considerable influence on the
policy decisions made by the Section, on the ef
fectiveness of its operations, and on the accom
plishment of its objectives.
The SEC Practice Section has three major
committees: the Executive Committee, the Peer
Review Committee, and the Special Investiga
tions Committee. Individual Board members are
assigned liaison responsibilities for each major
committee. Representatives of the Board attend
as observers all committee meetings and the pre
ponderance of meetings of subcommittees and
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task forces. All activities and decisions of the Sec
tion are reported and discussed at Board meetings,
which are held monthly or more frequently as
needed.
The major activity of the Section is ad
ministering the peer review program. Each mem
ber firm is required at least triennially to submit
its quality control system for its accounting and
auditing practice to an independent review by
peers. The findings of such review are formally
reported upon and the report placed in a public
file. Reports are either unqualified or modified.
Every peer review report, and some or all of the
reviewers’ workpapers, are critically examined by
the Board’s staff A copy of each modified report
is sent to Board members and discussed at Board
meetings. In addition, any significant differences
the staff has with respect to the appropriateness of
a given report are reported and discussed at
Board meetings. The Board’s procedures for
monitoring the peer review process are described
in another section of this report.
Every litigation matter reported to the Spe
cial Investigations Committee is reviewed in
detail by the Board’s staff. Summaries of the
issues in the case, prepared by the Committee’s
staff, are sent to all Board members and serve as a
basis for discussion at Board meetings.
Because of its active involvement in mon
itoring the program, the Board on several occasions
has made suggestions for improvement in various
aspects of the program. It does not hesitate to
express its dissatisfaction with a decision or pro
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posed decision on a particular matter, such as the
type of report accepted by the Peer Review Com
mittee. The Board is satisfied that, on those
occasions when it has offered another perspective
on an issue, serious attention has been accorded
the Board’s views.

Composition of the Board
The Board is a five-member, autonomous
group with the right to elect its own members and
chairman, subject to consultation with and con
currence by the AICPA Board of Directors. At a
specialmeeting in February 1984,John J. McCloy
announced his resignation as chairman and
member of the Public Oversight Board for per
sonal reasons. The Board accepted Mr. McCloy’s
decision with sincere regret. Arthur M. Wood,
formerly vice chairman, was elected chairman.
As of June 30, 1984, efforts are continuing to
find a qualified person to fill the vacancy created
by Mr. McCloy’s resignation. The current com
position of the Board and its staff is shown in
Exhibit II. [E D IT O R ’S N O T E: In August 1984,
Melvin R. Laird, former Secretary of Defense, was
appointed to the Board to fill the vacancy created
by the resignation of Mr. McCloy.]

SEC Practice Section
Organization of the Section
The important work of the Section is con
ducted by its three committees—the Executive
Committee, the Peer Review Committee, and the
Special Investigations Committee—whose com
position is set forth in Exhibit III.
The Executive Committee

The Executive Committee’s major respon
sibilities include establishing general policies for
the Section, administering and monitoring all its
activities, determining membership requirements,
and imposing sanctions, either on its own initia
tive or on recommendation of the Peer Review or
Special Investigations Committees.
The Committee currently consists of twentyone members elected by the AICPA Council for
three-year terms. The organizational document
of the Section provides that the Committee shall
at all times include representatives of all member
firms that audit financial statements of thirty or
more registrants under section 12 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. Currently, fourteen
member firms qualify for permanent Committee
representation.
During the year, John W. Zick of Price Waterhouse succeeded RayJ. Groves of Ernst & Whinney
as Executive Committee chairman.
The Peer Review Committee

The Peer Review Committee’s major responsi
bilities include establishing standards for perform
ing and reporting on peer reviews, administering
the peer review program, and taking whatever
measures it considers necessary to assure that
member firms are taking appropriate corrective
actions as a result of peer review findings.
The Committee can recommend that the
Executive Committee impose a sanction on a
firm for failing to take corrective action deemed
necessary by the Committee. It has not found it
necessary to do so to date. In every such case, the
firm agreed to correct quality control system or
compliance deficiencies and demonstrate appro
priate corrective action to the Committee as re
quested. Some actions were extensive in nature,
precipitating the requirement that the firm demon
strate implementation of its corrective action plan
by undergoing another full scope peer review the

following year. Corrective actions required by the
Committee are detailed in a later section of this
report.
The Committee consists of fifteen individuals
from member firms, appointed by the Executive
Committee. All Committee members have ex
tensive experience in the audit, review, or quality
control functions within their firms.
The Special Investigations Committee

The Special Investigations Committee’s major
responsibility is to perform such investigatory
procedures as it considers necessary to determine
whether facts relating to audit failures alleged in
litigation or formal proceedings and involving
audits of SEC registrants indicate (1) a possible
need for corrective action by the member firm in
question with respect to its quality control policies
and procedures or compliance with them, or (2)
that changes in generally accepted auditing stan
dards, generally accepted accounting principles,
or quality control standards need to be considered
The Committee consists of nine active or
former partners of member firms appointed by
the Executive Committee. Initial appointment is
for a three-year term, and members are eligible
for reappointment for a maximum of three addi
tional one-year terms. All members have exten
sive experience in the audits of SEC registrants.

The SECPS Review Committee
In February 1983, the chairman of the AICPA
appointed the SECPS Review Committee, an ad
hoc committee to review the structure, operations,
and effectiveness of the SEC Practice Section. The
objectives of the Committee were to evaluate the
activities of the Section and to determine whether
it is accomplishing its mission of improving the
quality of practice before the Securities and Ex
change Commission. The Board met with the
Committee and expressed its views and recom
mendations. The Board has read the Committee’s
report of findings and concurs with its recom
mendations which should enhance the effective
ness of the Section and a better understanding by
the public of its objectives and the means used to
attain those objectives. The Committee’s report
has been submitted to the AICPA Board of Direc
tors for approval and clearance to publish.
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The Peer Review Program
Each member firm is required to design and
implement a quality control system for its account
ing and auditing practice, as defined in Statement
on Quality Control Standards No. 1, System of
Quality Controlfor a CPA Firm, issued by the AICPA
Quality Control Standards Committee. The ele
ments of a quality control system are described in
the Board’s companion publication entitled Audit
Quality: The Profession’s Program. In addition, the
Section has established membership requirements
that obligate firms to implement practices that go
far beyond professional standards.
A key membership requirement is that once
every three years a member firm must have the
quality control system for its accounting and audit
ing practice reviewed and reported on by an
independent third party. The review may be con
ducted, at the option of the member firm, by
another member firm, by a team appointed by
the Peer Review Committee, by a team assembled
by an association of CPA firms to which the mem
ber belongs, or by a team assembled by a state
CPA society. To qualify to administer peer reviews
for its members, an association or a state society
must have its administrative plan approved by the
Peer Review Committee and have any common
quality control items such as manuals and educa
tional programs reviewed by an independent third
party. Currently, nine associations and one state
CPA society are authorized to administer peer
reviews for Section members.

Peer Reviews in 1983
In 1983, 144 firms were required to undergo
a peer review; 119 of these were reviews of firms
that had previously undergone review and 25
were initial reviews. Ten of the reviews were full
scope reviews performed prior to the normal
triennial requirement, pursuant to conditions
imposed by the Peer Review Committee because
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of its concern that the earlier reviews had dis
closed the need for extensive corrective action to
eliminate serious system deficiencies. All but three
of the 144 peer review reports were accepted by
the Committee as of June 30, 1984.
An unqualified report is issued when the
review discloses that the firm’s quality control sys
tem met the objectives of quality control stan
dards and was being complied with to provide the
firm with reasonable assurance of conforming
with professional standards. As indicated in Chart
A, over 94 percent of the firms reviewed in 1983
received an unqualified opinion, representing an
increase in excess of 10 percentage points over
firms receiving such reports in prior years.
A substantial majority of firms receiving un
qualified reports also receive letters of comments
which report (1) deficiencies noted in the quality
control system or in compliance by the firm’s per
sonnel with its quality control policies and pro
cedures and (2) recommendations for corrective
action. While such corrective action would result
in substantial improvement in the firm’s quality
control system or in compliance with its quality
control policies and procedures, the identified
deficiencies are not so serious as to negate the
conclusion that the reviewed system provides the
firm with reasonable assurance of compliance
with professional standards. Only 12 percent of
the firms reviewed in 1983 (and 7 percent of the
firms reviewed in prior years) did not receive a let
ter of comments. In most instances, firms receiv
ing an unqualified opinion without a letter of
comments were single-office firms.
Reviewed firms are required to respond in
writing to each item in the letter of comments stat
ing whether they have taken or intend to take the
suggested action to correct the deficiencies or
their reasons for not doing so.
A qualified report is issued when the review
discloses significant deficiencies in the firm’s quality

CHART A

Comparison of Types of Reports Issued on Reviews of
SEC Practice Section Member Firms in 1983 and in Prior Years

Firms receiving
unqualified opinion

□

Firms receiving
qualified opinion

control policies and procedures, a significant lack
of compliance with such policies and procedures,
and/or a significant lack of compliance with other
membership requirements. Only 5 percent of the
firms reviewed in 1983 received a qualified opin
ion, a significant drop from 13 percent in prior
years.
An adverse report is issued when the review
discloses that the firm’s quality control system is
not sufficiently comprehensive or not being com
plied with in a manner that provides the firm with
reasonable assurance that it is complying with
professional standards. Only one of the 141 reports
processed on 1983 reviews was adverse, whereas
13 of 473 or 2.7 percent of the reports issued on
reviews conducted in 1982 and prior years were
adverse. As indicated, reports on three 1983 re
views remain unprocessed by the Committee as
of Ju n e 30, 1984, for various technical reasons.
The percentage decrease in the number of
qualified and adverse opinions is, in the opinion
of the Board, direct evidence that the peer review
process is improving the quality of practice of
member firms. As previously noted, 119 firms
reviewed in 1983 had undergone a prior review.
The Committee reviews the findings and the
report issued on each review to ascertain whether
peer review standards have been observed and

□

Firms receiving
adverse opinion

whether the firm is responsive to the reviewer’s
findings and recommendations. If satisfied with
the report, letter of comments and response, the
Committee places these documents in a file main
tained by the Section for public inspection.

Improvement in Quality of Practice
by Member Firms
Most firms are found by peer reviewers to
have effective systems of quality control. However,
a few of the systems reviewed are found to have
serious deficiencies, which the firms agree to
remedy. Results obtained on subsequent peer
reviews provide convincing evidence of the serious
commitment Section members have made to im
prove th e quality of their accounting and auditing
services.
Twenty-three of the firms reviewed in 1983
had received a modified opinion on their initial
review. Ten of the firms were undergoing an ac
celerated review, pursuant to a condition imposed
by the Committee when it accepted the report on
the firm’s initial review. Of the twenty-three mod
ified opinions, eighteen were qualified and five
were adverse.
On the subsequent review, sixteen of the
eighteen firms receiving a qualified opinion on
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their initial review received an unqualified opin
ion on their 1983 review. Two of the five firms
receiving an adverse opinion on their initial review
received an unqualified opinion on their 1983
review, two received qualified opinions, and one
received another adverse opinion.
The report of the firm again receiving an
adverse opinion was accepted by the Committee
with the condition that the firm agree to some
extremely stringent corrective actions, including,
among other things, the engaging of a qualified
reviewer from outside the firm to perform pre
issuance reviews of all audit reports and related
workpapers. The Board has expressed its concern
to the Section’s Executive Committee regarding
the extended period of time over which the firm’s
unsatisfactory performance had been permitted
to continue without more decisive action being
taken. Accordingly, the Peer Review Committee
has formally notified the firm that failure to take
the required corrective actions immediately will
cause it to begin proceedings leading to the pos
sible imposition of a sanction.
Another case illustrates the success the Peer
Review Committee has had working with a firm
that was highly motivated to overcome its serious
quality control deficiencies. The firm received an
adverse opinion on its initial peer review in 1980.
As a result, the firm was reviewed again in 1982.
The results indicated that the firm had made
some improvement but not enough to warrant
the issuance of an unqualified opinion. The Com
mittee assigned one of its members to revisit the
firm periodically to assess the effectiveness of the
firm’s corrective action plan. The Committee
member reports that the firm has significantly
improved the quality of its accounting and audit
ing services.
The Board especially commends this firm
and the eighteen firms that received modified
reports and then made such significant progress
in improving their quality control systems as to
warrant unqualified reports on their subsequent
reviews.

Additional Requirements Imposed on Firms
by the Committee
During the year, the Committee took various
actions to assure that firms were effectively imple
menting corrective action plans in situations where
the peer review had surfaced serious quality con
trol deficiencies. Committee actions included:
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■ Revisits by the peer reviewer or a Committee mem
ber (Board staff participated in selected revisits) to
assess improvements.
■ Obtaining copies of the report of the firm’s inspec
tion program and, in the case of multioffice firms,
copies of the inspection reports on individual office
practice units to assess appropriateness of correc
tive action plans.

Type of Reviewer
Firms that were reviewed in 1980 were again
peer reviewed in 1983. A comparison of the types
of reviewers in 1980 and 1983 shows a definite
trend of firms selecting another firm to perform
the review rather than ask the Committee to ap
point a review team. Almost one-half of the firms
— 70 of 145 — were reviewed by committeeappointed-review-teams (CARTs) in 1980; the
percentage of firms using CARTs decreased by 19
percentage points in 1983 — to 41 of 144 firms.
The types of reviewers used in 1980 and 1983 are
shown in Chart B.
One possible reason for the greater use of
CARTs in 1980 was that use of other types of
reviewers then required the Committee to appoint
a quality control review panel for each such review,
which increased the cost to the reviewed firm. The
panel was eliminated by the Section in 1982,
upon recommendation of the Board. A study by
the Board had revealed that the quality control
review panel could not be cost justified because,
in general, the panel duplicated the work of the
primary reviewer and contributed little that was
not being provided by oversight procedures of
the Committee and the Board.
The quality of reviews performed by firms
and associations of firms generally compares favor
ably with the quality of work performed bv CARTs.
However, both the Committee’s staff and the
Board’s staff have noted instances where team
captains appointed by firms (firm-on-firm reviews)
or associations (association-administered reviews)
have not had sufficient experience and/or have
not adequately planned or participated in and
supervised the review. As a result, the Committee
has had to defer acceptance of several reports of
firm-on-firm and association-administered reviews
and require that:
■ Additional work be performed because the scope of
the review did not test a reasonable cross-section of
the firm’s accounting and auditing practice.
■ Reconsideration be given to achieving greater cor
relation between the review findings and the type of

CHART B

Comparison of Types of Reviewers
in 1980 and 1983 Peer Reviews

50%

40%

enced in quality control systems. One association
with a number of troublesome reviews has been
required to submit all future reviews to on-site
oversight by a Committee member and to reim
burse such member for expenses incurred.
Performance by CARTs was generally of high
quality. A reviewer whose performance is graded
as unsatisfactory is not appointed to another CART.
Also, eligibility for appointment to a CART ordi
narily requires attendance at a peer review train
ing program. The Committee presented such
programs again in 1984. The Board’s staff reviewed
and suggested refinements in the training materials
and acted as course instructors as well.

30%

C ontinuing M odification o f
Standards and Procedures
The peer review process is well past the
experimental stage, yet it is still evolving. The
evolutionary development of the process is con
tinuing at a healthy rate as is evidenced by the
changes that took place during the past year. Many
of the changes resulted from suggestions made by
the Board, the Executive Committee, the Special
Investigations Committee, and the SEC staff. In
cluded among the more important changes are
the following:

20%

10 %

□ 1980 Total
145

1983 Total
144

*Includes one review team appointed by a state CPA society
authorized by the Peer Review Committee to administer
such a program.

report issued and the items included in the letter
of comments.
■ “Open question” be resolved concerning the reviewed
firm’s possible noncompliance with professional
standards on some of its accounting and auditing
engagements.
The Committee has dealt effectively with
these types of substandard peer review perfor
mance. For example, one firm has been asked
and agreed to subject future peer review reports to
a preissuance review by another partner experi

Consideration of Litigation Alleging Audit Failure
Peer review guidelines were silent as to whether
a reviewer had to consider pending litigation alleg
ing audit failure as a factor in setting the scope of a
peer review. A reviewer is now required to con
sider whether litigation alleging audit failure that
is required to be reported to the Special Inves
tigations Committee by the firm should be con
sidered in determining the scope of that firm’s
forthcoming peer review. Such consideration may
suggest that specific offices, personnel, audits in a
particular industry, certain quality control ele
ments, or accounting issues may require special
attention. This modification of the peer review
guidelines does not diminish in any wav the im
portant work of the Special Investigations Com
mittee, which is discussed in a later section of
this report.
Qualifications of Reviewers
The only qualification for a firm to serve as a
peer reviewer in the early years was that it be a
member of the Section. To be eligible to conduct
peer reviews, a firm must now itself have been
peer reviewed. While it is not expected that firms

13

receiving a modified or an adverse report will be
selected to conduct another firm’s peer review,
the Board has noted that the Peer Review Com
mittee of the Private Companies Practice Section
requires that a firm must have received an un
qualified opinion on its own review to be eligible
to serve as a reviewer. The Board believes that the
SEC Practice Section should consider adopting a
similar rule.
Resolution o f Disagreements

Until this year, there was no provision for
resolving a disagreement between the Committee
and a reviewer with respect to the type of report to
be issued. Though such disagreements are few in
number, the question sometimes arises as to
whether a particular report should be unqual
ified or qualified. Such disagreements have even
tually been resolved by the reviewers accepting
the Committee’s position or convincing the Com
mittee of the merit of their judgm ent.
Under the new procedure, if a review team
and the Committee should now disagree on the
appropriateness of the report issued, the Com
mittee, in certain circumstances, may appoint a
special task force to perform an independent review
and issue its own report which will be placed in
the public file. Or, the review team’s report may
be placed in the public file together with a memo
randum citing the reasons for the Committee’s
disagreement with that report.
Effect o f M AS Engagements on Independence

The SEC and others have observed that the
fees received for performance of management
advisory services (MAS) may be perceived as an
impairment of the independence of the auditor.
Guidelines for testing compliance with the Sec
tion’s membership requirements now require
the reviewer to ascertain whether the firm per
formed MAS engagements for an SEC registrant
for which the MAS fees exceeded the audit fees.
Reviewers are required to consider this informa
tion when selecting MAS engagements for testing
compliance with the independence requirements.
The Board believes that audit engagements per
formed for such clients (i.e., those for whom the
firm also performed MAS engagements) should
be included in the sample of audit engagements
to be reviewed, especially if MAS fees exceeded
audit fees for three consecutive years.
Non- GAAS Audits

Professional literature prior to September
1983 was silent as to what an auditor was required
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to do when he learned that he had not performed
all audit procedures considered necessary for the
issuance of an audit report he had already released.
In September 1983, the Auditing Standards Board
(ASB) issued Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 46, Consideration of Omitted Procedures After the
Report Date, which specifies actions that an auditor
should take in such circumstances. This ASB pro
nouncement resulted from a concern expressed
by the Board, and shared by the SEC, that auditors
be given more definitive guidance in these matters.
When a peer review team reviews an engage
ment and concludes that the firm did not perform
sufficient procedures to support the audit report
issued, the team is unable to ascertain whether
the financial statements were prepared in accord
ance with generally accepted accounting prin
ciples. Under these conditions, the firm is required
to document the actions it plans to take or its basis
for concluding that no action is required. If the
review team believes that the firm’s decision is
inappropriate, the matter is referred to the Peer
Review Committee for action. Procedures for
resolution of differences between the Committee
and a member firm are now in place.
Timely Submission o f Peer Review Reports

Some peer review reports were not being
submitted to the Committee for processing on a
timely basis. To expedite the reporting of review
results, commencing with the reviews performed
in 1983, team captains are now required to trans
mit the report and letter of comments to the
reviewed firm within thirty days of completing
the review or face the possibility of sanctions. The
reviewed firm is then required to forward the
report, letter of comments, and its response to the
Committee within thirty days after receipt of the
report and letter of comments or face the possibility
of sanctions. The new policy has improved the
timeliness of submission of peer review reports.
During the past year, Committee task forces
have become involved in the resolution of com
plex problems on several peer reviews, including
two of the three unprocessed reviews at June 30,
1984. The resolution of complex problems under
standably is a time-consuming process, and the
Board recognizes the time and effort that various
members of the Committee have expended this
year in problem resolution.
Areas for Improvement

The Board believes there are areas where
further improvement can be effected. Uniformity
in the reporting of peer review findings is one of

these. The determination of whether deficiencies
uncovered in a peer review are sufficiently signifi
cant to warrant issuing a modified report is a
highly qualitative, judgmental matter. In several
instances, reviewers have issued unqualified opin
ions in circumstances in which the Board believes
other reviewers faced with the same set of facts
would issue modified reports. In these cases, defi
ciencies have been reported in the letter of com
ments as areas for substantial improvement and
the letter of comments is placed in the public file.
However, since a reviewed firm may distribute its
report to clients or prospective clients without the
attendant letter of comments, a firm receiving an
unqualified report without a letter of comments
may have a comparative advantage over the firm
receiving an unqualified report with a letter of
comments. Accordingly, the Board believes that a
reference should be placed in each report, where
appropriate, to the effect that a letter of com
ments was issued in conjunction with the issuance
of the report.
A second matter that requires reconsider
ation—and additional guidance—is when a report
should be modified because the firm did not per
form an annual inspection as required by quality
control standards. During the year, the Peer Review
Committee, while concluding that an annual in
spection is an important activity for all firms,
nevertheless agreed that the peer review report of
firms with fewer than twenty professionals need
not be modified for lack of timely performance of
inspection during the intervening years between
peer reviews, provided no other significant deficien
cies were noted during the review. Noncompliance
with the inspection requirement, however, is re
quired to be reported in the letter of comments.
The Board recognizes that the rule on the
size of firm was an arbitrary one and does not
question the Committee’s judgment on that mat
ter. However, the Board notes that the Commit
tee applied the concept underlying the rule to the
review of a larger firm. The Board has informed
the Committee that the rule should be either
enforced or eliminated, rather than applied in
what the Board believes is an inconsistent manner.

1983, peer reviewers reviewed the financial state
ments, reports, and workpapers for 1,315 audit
engagements. Thirty-three of these were deemed
to be substandard in the application of generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). In two of fif
teen cases in which the financial statements were
not in accordance with GAAP, the firm immedi
ately recalled its report and the financial statements
were reissued. The remaining cases generally in
volved reports given limited distribution and did
not require immediate recall; however, the firms
agreed to cause the deficiencies to be corrected in
the subsequent year’s report.
The Board’s staff found reviewers diligent in
pursuing instances of noncompliance with GAAP
or GAAS. The fact that two-and-one-half percent
of the engagements reviewed were identified as
substandard reflects the objectivity of the reviewers.
In each instance where the peer reviewers con
cluded that the audit had not been performed in
accordance with GAAS, the firm either immedi
ately recalled its report and the financial statements
to perform the procedures in a subsequent immi
nent audit. Table 1 summarizes the actions taken
by the firms in connection with engagements
found not to have been performed in accordance
with professional standards.
TABLE 1

Corrective Action Required by Peer Review
Committee with Respect to Substandard
Audit Engagements Identified in Peer
Reviews Performed in 1983

Number of audit engagements review ed.............................. 1,315
Number of audit engagements considered substandard
by peer reviewers ...............................................................

33

(2.5%)
Corrective Actions Required
Audit report recalled and financial statements revised
and reissue d.......................................................................

2

Omitted auditing procedures performed ..............................

5

Omitted auditing procedures—firm has not yet informed
Committee of actions to be ta k e n *.....................................

3

Cause of impairment of independence elim inated...............

1

GAAP and GAAS deficiencies not requiring immediate action
to be corrected in subsequent year's a u d it.............................. 22
Total ....................................................................................

Substandard Performance on
Individual Engagements
The peer review process also deals with in
stances of substandard auditing or accounting
performance on individual engagements, which
are reported promptly to the Committee. During

33

* Engagements identified in review processed by Committee in
March 1984.

The fact that even a small percentage of en
gagements is deemed not to have been per
formed in accordance with professional standards
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is disturbing. Nevertheless, it was concluded that
these were not the result of systems deficiencies
but generally because of what is sometimes referred
to as “ people problems.” The Board takes com
fort from the fact that, absent the peer review pro
cess, these instances of substandard performance
may have gone undetected for a much longer
period of time and could have eventuated in in
vestor losses if it were not for timely discovery
and correction.

Monitoring of MAS Engagements
Member firms are required to report certain
information regarding fees received for manage
ment advisory services (MAS) engagements. Such
information is included in the firm’s annual report
which is placed in the public file. Analysis of the
MAS data reported by members of the Section
indicates that almost 90 percent of member firms
generate fees from performance of MAS engage
ments that are less than 20 percent of total fees. A
recent analysis shows:
Percentage of MAS Fees
to Total Fees
Num ber of
Section Members

0-9%

10-19%

20-50%

Over
50%

Total

With SEC clients . . . .

123

57

15

1

196

With no SEC clients . .

118

80

36

2

236

Total ........................ .

241

137

51

3

432

31.7%

11.8%

0.7%

100.0%

Percentage ............. . 55.8%

Section monitoring of MAS engagements is
accomplished in two ways:
■ Firms must report the number of SEC clients for
which MAS fees are in excess of 100 percent of fees
for audit services for three consecutive years.
■ Tests are performed during the triennial peer review
to determine whether the firm has:
□ Complied with the AICPA Code of Ethics and
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Statements on Standards for Management Advisory
Services dealing with independence in performing
MAS engagements for SEC clients.
□ Abstained from performing stipulated MAS en
gagements proscribed by the Section.
□ Reported to the audit committee of board of
directors of each SEC client the amount of MAS fees
received and the services performed.
Peer review teams test compliance with these
membership requirements by using special work
programs designed by the Section’s Peer Review
Committee. These procedures have not surfaced
any evidence that suggests that proscribed services
have been performed or that performance of MAS
by member firms has diluted the objectivity re
quired in performance of the audit function.

Board Oversight of Peer Review Process
Representatives of the Board actively mon
itor the peer review process by attending all meet
ings of the Peer Review Committee and its Evalua
tion Subcommittee and by monitoring individual
peer reviews. Each review is subjected to one of
three types of Board oversight: (1) observing the
performance of the field work, attending the exit
conference where the results are reported to firm
management, and reviewing the team’s workpapers, report, and letter of comments, and the
reviewed firm’s letter of response; (2) reviewing
the workpapers and the report and letters issued;
or (3) reviewing selected reviewers’ workpapers
including the summary review memorandum and
the report and letters issued. During the current
year, the Board observed reviews in process of all
but one of the firms with five or more SEC clients
and, based on selected criteria, visited a number
of firms with fewer than five SEC clients and a rep
resentative number of firms with no SEC clients.
Chart C summarizes this phase of the Board’s
oversight.

tunity to express their views and to receive response
to such expressions. The Board is convinced that
this aspect of the self-regulatory process is function
ing effectively and accomplishing the purposes
for which intended.

The Board finds its access to the peer review
activities of the Section entirely satisfactory for
discharge of its oversight responsibilities. Discus
sion at Committee meetings is free and frank, and
Board members and its staff have adequate oppor

CHART C

Scope of Board Oversight of 1983 Peer Reviews Classified by Number of SEC Clients of
Reviewed Firms
0

25%

50%

No. of SEC
Clients

11

5 to 29

14

1 to 4

Total

100%
No. of
Firms
11

_______________ _______________

30 or More

None

75%

10

1

28

5

19

21

40

Visitation and workpaper review

35

50

Workpaper review

15

57

61

54

144

Report review
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Special Investigative Process
Member firms are required to report to the Spe
cial Investigations Committee each litigation or
proceeding (case) against them or members of
their firms involving allegations of failure in the
conduct of an audit of the financial statements of
an SEC registrant. This requirement became ef
fective for litigation or proceedings initiated on or
after November 1, 1979. The Committee deter
mines whether the allegations of audit failure
indicate a need for improvements in the quality
control systems of the reporting firms or com
pliance with them or whether changes in pro
fessional standards are required.

Objectives of the Process
The activities of the Special Investigations
Committee supplement the peer review process
as a means of protecting users of financial state
ments. The Committee’s investigative process
focuses on reducing the possibility of future failures
by(1) identifying deficiencies in the firm’s quality
control system that may have permitted the alleged
deficiency to occur and (2) causing such deficien
cies to be corrected.

Operation of the Committee
For each reported case, the member firm is
required to provide copies of the complaint, rele
vant financial statements, SEC or other regulatory
filings, and, if requested, other relevant public
documents. The staff of the Committee prepares
a summary of the submitted data, identifying the
accounting, auditing, and quality control issues
involved. Copies of all documents and the staff
summary are sent to all Committee members.
One or two Committee members are assigned
as a task force to study the issues in each reported
case and to make recommendations to the Com
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mittee as to the action that should be taken. Each
case is subjected to prescribed initial investigative
procedures, during which the task force considers
the nature of the allegations and their implications.
In some cases, analysis of the complaint and the
financial statements to which it relates permit the
Committee to conclude that the allegations are
without merit. In other cases, the procedures are
supplemented by a discussion of the allegations
between representatives of the task force and the
firm and a review of the findings of the firm’s most
recent peer review.
If the results of the initial investigative pro
cedures warrant, the case is monitored in order to
follow and evaluate future developments, such as
the issuance of a report of a peer review in process
or the issuance of a bankruptcy trustee’s report.
If the allegations appear to indicate that there
may be serious deficiencies in, or compliance
with, the firm’s quality control system, the Com
mittee will order a special review of those aspects
of the firm’s system that, if effective, ordinarily
should prevent or detect deficiencies of the type
alleged to have occurred. Such a review involves
application of procedures identical to those used
in peer review. The Section has adopted a policy
which requires cost of the special review to be
borne by the firm.
Files are closed on cases when the Commit
tee concludes that the allegations appear not to
have merit, do not indicate a deficiency in the
firm’s quality control system, or if a deficiency
may have existed, that appropriate corrective action
has been taken to guard against the possibility of
future failure.

Activity During the Year
At July 1, 1983, the Committee had open
files on fifteen cases. Twenty-seven cases were

added to the Committee’s agenda during the
year. A summary of the year’s activity is shown in
Table 2.
TABLE 2

Special Investigations Committee Activity
for the Year Ended June 30, 1984
Cases

Cases

R e s u ltin g

U n d e r g o in g

in a S p e c ia l

In itia l

Cases

R e v ie w o f th e

I n v e s t ig a t iv e

B e in g

F ir m 's Q u a lit y

P ro c e d u re s

M o n it o r e d

C o n t r o l S y s te m

Status of cases at
July 1, 1983 .................

13

10

2

Activity during the year:
Cases added .............

27

Cases transferred to
m onitoring...............

[13]

13

Cases closed .............

[13]

[19]

Status of cases at
June 3 0 , 1984 .............

14

6

Cases moved from
special review status
to permit monitoring
of firm’s corrective
action plan .............

2

in November 1979. While most cases involve
alleged audit failures involving SEC registrants,
some non-SEC cases were voluntarily reported by
member firms in response to a request by the
Committee because of high public interest in the
case. The Board believes that all such requests of
the Committee were appropriate and believes
that the affected firms are to be commended for
their cooperation.
Since allegations of audit failure involving
any entity may be indicative of a deficiency in the
firm’s quality control system or in generally ac
cepted auditing standards, the SECPS Review
Committee has recommended extending the liti
gation reporting requirement to include certain
cases involving non-SEC registrants. The Board
believes that the reporting requirement should
be expanded to include allegations of audit failure
of companies in which there is a high public
interest.

[2]

Reevaluation of Professional Standards
0

As indicated, files on two cases involving
special reviews were open at the beginning of the
year. Those two cases were placed in monitoring
status during the year, pending a determination
of the effectiveness of the firm’s action plan to cor
rect deficiencies noted during the special review.
Other cases are being monitored awaiting the
outcome of expected future developments. No
cases reported during the year resulted in the
Committee’s requiring a member firm to undergo
a special review. In some cases, the need for a spe
cial review was obviated by actions initiated by the
firm involved, where the firm reported its action
to the Committee and made documentation of
such action available. Actions taken by firms ranged
from transfer of personnel and attendant reassign
ment of specific responsibilities to an intensive
review of selected aspects of the firm’s quality
control system.
A more detailed description of the operation
of the Committee and its decision-making pro
cess is contained in the Board’s publication entitled
Audit Quality: The Profession’s Program.
Files on ninety-five cases have been opened
by the Committee since inception of the program

In addition to assessing the quality control
implications of allegations in litigation, the Com
mittee considers whether the allegations indicate
a deficiency in professional standards or a need
for additional guidance.
Cases reported during the year prompted
the Committee to take several such actions. For
example, noting that similar allegations were made
in several reported cases involving bank audits,
the Committee became concerned that the allega
tions were lessening the confidence of users of
audited financial statements of banks. As a result,
the Committee asked the profession’s audit stan
dard-setters to reassess the effectiveness of current
bank audit guidance in light of the allegations.
Members of the Committee met with members of
the AICPA’s Banking Committee and the chair
man of the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board.
As a result, the Banking Committee published
additional information regarding appropriate bank
auditing procedures and reassessed the adequacy
of its recently published Bank Audit Guide.
On other occasions in its brief history, the
Committee (1) conferred with representatives of
the AICPA’s Insurance Committee to discuss
issues raised in cases that may have implications
on existing standards and (2) urged the AICPA’s
Accounting Standards Executive Committee to
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accelerate its consideration of income recognition
issues of certain insurance industry transactions.

Board Oversight of SIC Activities
The Board actively monitors the activities of
the Committee and its task forces and has com
plete access to all Committee files. Members of
the Board’s staff read all the pertinent documents,
financial information, correspondence related to
individual cases, as well as the Committee-staffprepared summaries and relevant professional
literature. Board members are sent copies of each
case summary, which serves as a basis for discus
sion at Board meetings. Members of the Board
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and/or its staff attend all Committee meetings
and, at its discretion, meetings of the Commit
tee’s task forces with firm representatives to dis
cuss allegations in specific cases.
Activities of the Committee and its decisions
on each case are reported on and discussed at
Board meetings. Based on its extensive monitor
ing, the Board concludes that the Committee has
effective operational procedures, that Committee
members take their responsibilities seriously, and
that the Committee’s decisions are sound and in
the interest of the public and the profession.

Membership in the Division
Almost 1,700 firms belong to the Division for
CPA Firms: 417 belong to both the SEC Practice
Section and Private Companies Practice Section,
13 belong only to the SEC Practice Section, and
another 1,233 firms are members of only the
Private Companies Practice Section.
Despite the “ loss” of thirty-four members
through merger, net membership in the Division
increased by twelve firms — an increase of three
SECPS-only firms, an increase of thirteen in both

TABLE 3

sections, and a loss of four firms that belong only
to the Private Companies Practice Section. Table
3 presents an analysis of changes in membership
for the year ended June 30, 1984, with firms classi
fied according to whether they do or do not audit
at least one SEC registrant.
The impact that the Division has on the quality
of accounting and auditing services cannot be
judged solely by the number of member firms.
Member firms audit over 11,500 SEC registrants,

Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms by Number of SEC Clients and by Section—
July 1, 1983 to June 30, 1984

Number of firms classified by
firms with and with no
SEC clients
Firms with 1 or
more SEC clients
SECPS only
Both sections
PCPS only

6
190
119

—
7
2

6
183
117

1
11
13

1
[3]
2

1
6
15

—
4
[4]

7
189
113

315

9

306

25

—

22

—

309

Firms with no
SEC clients
SECPS only
Both sections
PCPS only

4
226
1,140

—
5
20

4
221
1,120

2
17
152

—
1
[1]

—
7
155

—
[4]
4

6
228
1,120

Totals

1,370

25

1,345

171

—

162

—

1,354

All firms
SECPS only
Both sections
PCPS only

10
416
1,259

—
12
22

10
404
1,237

3
28
165

1
[2]
1

1
13
170

—
—
—

13
417
1,233

Totals

1,685

34

1,651

196

—

184

—

1,663

Totals

* All 12 firms that were members of both sections merged with other firms that are members of both sections. Of the 22 PCPS-only firms, 15
merged with firms that are members of both sections and the remaining 7 merged with other PCPS-only members.
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TABLE 4

Analysis of Membership in the Division for CPA Firms — July 1, 1983 and June 30, 1984
Division for CPA Firms

SEC Section

July 1
1983*

June 30
1984

Increase
(Decrease)

July 1
1983*

June 30
1984

Number of firms ...........................................................................
1,651
Number of SEC clients ................................................................. 10,330
Number of practice u n its ..............................................................
3,771
Number of professionals.............................................................. 100,024

1,663
11,543
3,742
100,846

8
1,213
[29]
822

414
10,147
1,957
83,925

430
11,366
1,974
85,192

Classification

Increase
16
1,219
17
1,267

*Adjusted for mergers July 1 , 1983 to June 3 0 , 1984

operate over 3,700 practice units in the United
States, and employ over 100,000 professionals.
Details are shown in Table 4.

Auditors of Publicly-traded Companies
Firms that are members of the Division audit
the financial statements of the vast majority of
publicly-traded companies. Two hundred fiftyfour member firms audit over 85 percent of all
public companies listed in the eleventh edition of
Who Audits America.2 As shown in Chart D, these
companies account for over 98 percent of the
combined sales volume of all publicly-traded
companies. It should be noted that over 79 per
cent of the number of companies are audited by
firms that are entitled to a permanent seat on the
Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section;
these companies account for 98 percent of the
aggregate sales of all publicly-traded companies.
Members of the Division audit all but three
of the companies whose stocks are listed on the
New York Stock Exchange and all but twentyeight of the companies listed on the American
Stock Exchange; approximately one-third of these
are audited by Canadian firms of chartered ac
countants that are affiliated with firms that are
members of the Division.

Membership Promotion
While the statistics cited above are impressive,
a broader base of membership is desirable to pro-

2 Who Audits America. 11th ed. (Menlo Park, Calif: Data Financial
Press, 1984).
3 Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report, 1982, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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vide the public with the full benefits of the peerregulatory program. The Board shares the view of
the SEC as reported in its most recent report to
Congress: “The Commission continues to believe
that all accounting firms which audit public com
panies should join the SECPS.” 3
Efforts to increase membership should be
intensified with special emphasis upon attracting
auditors of SEC registrants to the SEC Practice
Section. The Board is aware that the Division is
giving serious consideration to initiating a mul
tifaceted program intended to increase mem
bership and better inform persons both within
and outside the accounting profession about the
program and the commitment to high quality ser
vice that membership in the Division represents.
The Board urges the Division to implement such
a program. The investing public would benefit
from an increase in the number of firms commit
ted to conduct their practices in accordance with
the requirements of Division membership.

CHART D

Analysis of Firms That Audit Publicly-traded Companies
Listed in the Eleventh Edition of Who Audits America

Number of
Publicly-traded
Companies

Annual Sales of
Publicly-traded
Companies
Millions of Dollars

Audited by U.S.
firms that are not
members of the
Division

12.08%
( 1, 120)

Auditors not
identified

1.43%
(133)

Audited by foreign
firms

0.67%
(62)

Audited by firms
that are members of
Private Companies
Practice Section
only

1.21%

Audited by other
firms that are
members of SEC
Practice Section

Audited by firms
entitled to
permanent seat on
Executive
Committee
of SEC Practice
Section

1.47%
$56,217
Audited by firms
that are not
members of the
Division

(112)

98.53%
$3,761,470
5.38%
(499)

Audited by firms
that are members
of the Division

79.23%
(7,345)
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SEC Oversight of the Program
The Board maintains a liaison relationship between
the SEC and the SEC Practice Section. During the
course of the past year, Board representatives met
periodically with the SEC Chief Accountant and
members of his staff to discuss various issues.
The SEC independently evaluates the peer
review process of the SEC Practice Section, includ
ing the effectiveness of Board oversight. The SEC
inspects a sample of peer review team workpapers
of firms that audit SEC registrants and Board
oversight workpapers under an arrangement agreed
to by the Section. All workpapers are masked so as
not to reveal the identity of individual clients.
Under a 1982 modification of that arrangement,
workpapers relating to firms with fewer than ten
SEC clients are masked to conceal the identity of
the reviewed firm also in order to reduce further
the possibility of client identification.
A continuing unresolved issue between the
Section and the SEC is whether the SEC should be
given direct access to the activities of the Special
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Investigations Committee, or to evidence of those
activities. Lacking the direct access it desires, the
SEC asserts it has no basis for independently
determining the effectiveness of the Committee’s
discharge of its responsibilities. The Section’s posi
tion is that confidentiality is essential to the opera
tion of the Committee; without it, member firms
would not be as candid and forthright in respond
ing to inquiries made by the Committee. Dis
cussions between the Section and the SEC regarding
this issue were deferred pending completion of
the SECPS Review Committee’s study, which in
cludes study of this matter in depth.

Conclusion
The past six years have given all members of the
Board a comprehensive understanding of the
importance of and the difficulties with self-regula
tion. Our views of self- regulation have been affected
by an increased understanding of the total pro
fessional regulatory scheme. The Board views
regulation of the profession as a complex, inter
related disciplinary process at three distinct levels
and involving a number of responsibilities. The
purpose of professional regulation—continuing,
satisfactory professional service at a competitive
price—can be assured only if each of the three
levels of regulation—private, peer, and public—
fulfills its responsibility, and if each cooperates
sufficiently and thus in combination constitute an
integrated structure, uniform in expectations and
consistent in requirements.
The Board has come to realize that perhaps
the most substantial, and certainly the least recog
nized, force for improvement of professional per
formance is private regulation, the discipline im
posed by management of individual firms as they
strive to meet the demands of competition and to
achieve professional standards.
Professional or peer- regulation also plays an
integral role in the overall regulation of the account
ing profession. The peer review and special inves
tigative processes of the SEC Practice Section are
especially vital and effective components of the
profession’s self-regulatory program.
Members of the Board are sometimes asked
if it can provide measures of the success of the
self- regulatory program in the accounting profes
sion. Our response must be that we have no pre
cise measurement, but we note considerable evi
dence provided by independent third parties that
confirm our conclusion that the program is achiev
ing its stated objectives. For example,

profession is doing a good job. Its self-regulatory
efforts have been successful, but they must con
tinue. Audit performance has been significantly
improved over the past decade. Additional quality
controls have been implemented and they are
working.”4
■ Several departments of the U.S. government, such
as Energy, Labor, and Agriculture, now require
accounting firms seeking to provide services to
those departments to include in their proposals the
date and results of their latest peer review.
■ On more than one occasion, the SEC has required a
firm, as part of a consent agreement following an
enforcement action, to join the SEC Practice Section
and submit its quality control system to peer review.
■ A Regional Trial Board—an integral part of the
Joint Ethics Enforcement Program of the AICPA
and state CPA societies—recently found two mem
bers guilty of violating technical standards and will
expel them from the state CPA society and the
AICPA unless a peer review of their firm has been
completed on a timely basis.
■ The National Association of State Boards of Ac
countancy is encouraging state boards to implement
positive enforcement programs to detect work not
done in accordance with professional standards
and to require firms doing such work to undergo a
peer review.
The Division deserves to be commended
again this year for continuing its efforts to strengthen
the quality of auditing and accounting practice by
its member firms. Nevertheless, its officers and
members, like the members of the Board, recog
nize that there is progress yet to be made and such
progress can be expected.

■ L. Glenn Perry, Chief Accountant of the SEC’s Divi
sion of Enforcement, finds that “...the accounting

4L. Glenn Perry, “The SEC’s Enforcement Activities,” The CPA Journal,
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, New
York, New York (April 1984).
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SELF-REGULATION CRITICISMS AND
A RESPONSE
How peer regulation
works—and
works well.
by Robert K. Mautz
Criticism is often irritating and sometimes
helpful. Because of the possibility o f helpful
ness, wisdom requires that the criticism, how
ever irritating, not be rejected out of hand.
What, then, to do with it? Experience sug
gests that criticism should be examined to de
termine the point of view from which it is
expressed, then that point of view should be
analyzed to ascertain whether its perspective
on the subject criticized is sufficiently appro
priate that the criticism ought to be heeded.
In the year since I last spoke at the National
Conference on Current SEC Developments,
the public oversight board (POB) and the
American Institute of CPAs self-regulatory
program have been subjected to outspoken
criticism. Four are cited here as examples:
“ One CPA in jail would do more than all
your peer reviews.”
“ Regulators seek out,those who do wrong
and punish them. That’s what regulators
do. If you don’t do that, you may have a
great system for improving professional
practice, but you do not have self-regula
tion.”

POB. This so-called public board is ap
pointed by the executive committee of the
division’s SEC practice section [SECPS],
which is controlled by the votes of the eight
largest firms. To date, the POB hasn’t cen
sured, admonished or disciplined any ac
counting firm, especially those involved in
the audit failures.”
“ I have pointed up legal proceeding after
legal proceeding, SEC action after SEC ac
tion, against major firm after major firm,
wherein such firms have been judged to
have violated GAAP after GAAP and/or
GAAS after GAAS. All these determina
tions notwithstanding, our disciplinary ap
paratus (in the AICPA, the POB and else
where) appears impotent to proceed against
the miscreants who are entrenched within
the Establishment.”
From what perspective do these comments
come? Apparently, either from regulators or
from those who believe the AICPA program
should be judged by the standards of govern
ment regulators. Does that represent a point o f
view the POB should urge on the SECPS? I
think not.
One interesting aspect of challenges and
criticisms is that they need no support. Mere
utterance gives them status. Responses to
them, however, especially if they are dis
agreements, require justification to have any
standing. What follows is the rationalization
that has led to my disagreement with the criti
cisms cited.

“ Perhaps the most cynical aspect o f the
[AICPA] division for [CPA] firms is the
Author’s note: Initially presented as my views in a talk pre
pared for the American Institute of CPAs 11th National Con
ference on Current SEC Developments, this adaptation has
since been reviewed by the public oversight board (POB) of
the SEC practice section (SECPS) of the AICPA division for
CPA firms and generally expresses the board's sentiments.
The POB oversees the self-regulatory efforts of the SECPS.
The conference was held in Washington, D.C., on January 10
and 11, 1984.

ROBERT K. MAUTZ, CPA, Ph.D., is a member of the public
oversight board of the SEC practice section of the American
Institute of CPAs division for CPA firms and is director of the
Paton Accounting Center at the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor. A member of the Accounting Hall of Fame, Dr. Mautz
is a past president of the American Accounting Association
and a former editor of the Accounting Review; he also has
served on the AICPA council and board of directors. In 1980
he was awarded the Gold Medal, the Institute’s highest honor.

Reprinted from the April 1984 issue o f the Journal of Accountancy
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The Scope of Regulation
Regulation , as it is widely used in general
conversation and as it was interpreted by the
founders of the AICPA program, is a broad
term. Regulation of the practice of accounting
includes all measures intended to protect the
public from exploitation and inadequate ser
vice by accountants. This comprehends a
wide range of activities. Certainly it includes
the activities of government regulators as they
set standards for public practice, license those
who qualify, establish laws and regulations,
and seek out and punish wrongdoers. It also
includes the efforts exerted within a CPA firm
to avoid errors and mistakes; to provide reli
able, satisfactory service; to train and super
vise staff; to inspect the work of practice units;
to insist on consultation when appropriate; to
reward partners and employees who do well;
to discipline those who fail to meet the firm’s
standards.
Regulation, as the AICPA program con
ceives of it, includes three distinct levels of
control, which we can describe as government
regulation, peer regulation and private regula
tion.
Government regulation. Government regu
lation of accounting includes the laws, regula
tions, licensing requirements, courts, legisla
tures, com m issions and legal procedures
designed to protect the public from fraud,
gross negligence and breach of contract by
accountants acting in their professional capac
ity. Note that government regulation concerns
itself with activities below the level of social
acceptability. Accountants and others who
run afoul of the law have failed to meet the
lowest standards acceptable to the communi
ty. Punishment o f some kind, including possi
ble loss o f the privilege to practice, typically
follows legal establishment of guilt.
The U .S. concept of justice strives to assure
accountants charged with wrongdoing, as
well as those who claim to have been injured,
a fair trial in an adversary proceeding. Plain
tiffs have the right of discovery; both parties
are entitled to counsel and judicial propriety.
Government regulation is the most visible
form of regulation. Few events are considered
more newsworthy than the arrest and ultimate
conviction of someone charged with breaking
the law. This form of regulation is involun
tary, is imposed with ultimate enforcement
authority and is accomplished at considerable
cost. Government regulation is primarily a de
terrent. It is designed to prevent future occur
rences of unacceptable behavior by persons
found guilty. It is also designed to enforce

minimum standards, not necessarily to im
prove the general level of service; nor is there
necessarily any continuing effect of enforce
ment beyond the persons directly involved.
Contrary to the thought expressed by the first
critic cited, punishing the convicted has not
proved to be a great deterrent to others for a
great many types of unacceptable behavior.
There is no available evidence that it is more
successful for accountants.
Peer regulation. Compared with govern
ment regulation, peer regulation is almost in
visible. It has minimum media appeal. It is a
voluntary professional effort conducted by a
professional organization to improve the qual
ity of service provided by the members of the
profession. Some members o f the profession
may work to influence the passage of law s and
regulations. We do not think o f that as peer
regulation. We do include within that phrase
the establishment of standards that the mem
bers of the organization agree to comply with,
as well as the testing of compliance with those
established standards.
Because membership in the professional or
ganization is voluntary, there is little authority
in support of peer regulation other than peer

“By establishing professional
standards for quality control and then
testing firms’ compliance with those
standards, peer regulation teaches
the nature of quality control to all
who are reviewed.”
pressure and possibly some fear that failure to
meet peer standards will become a competi
tive disadvantage.
Peer regulation must call for standards
higher than the legal minimum accepted by
the community or there is little reason for its
existence. A professional organization calling
for nothing more than conformity with the law
would have little standing. If it called for any
thing less, it would be a conspiracy. Peer reg
ulation thus differs from government regula
tion in a number of ways. It is positive in
effect, calling for service o f higher quality
than is required under the law. It is also likely
to have a continuing effect, especially if the
compliance tests are rigorous and applied con
sistently. If the standards themselves are re
viewed and updated periodically, the effect is
both strengthened and lengthened. Finally,
peer regulation reaches far more practitioners
than does government regulation. All mem
bers of the profession are reached by the for
mer; only those who fall below society’s norm
become involved with the latter.
Private regulation. Private regulation, for
all intents and purposes, is invisible. What
one does inside one’s own organization is

rarely brought to the attention of others, and
when it is, the interest tends to be minimal.
Yet it is the most pervasive and probably the
most productive of all types o f regulation.
Certainly it affects the most people. Most ac
countants have their first and perhaps only
experience with regulation at the level of pri
vate regulation. It is here— emphasized in
training classes, manuals and on-the-job ex
perience— that the young accountant learns
how professional standards are applied, what
supervision and review of an audit engage
ment mean and what the consequences are
when a supervisor’s expectations are not met.
Thus, private regulation has the broadest in
fluence, is directed at improved service and
can perform to standards as high as the per
sonal pride o f the partners or the demands of
their competition and clients require. It is es
sentially constructive in nature, although the
possibility o f punishment is always present.
Private regulation is voluntary. As a firm’s
management seeks to meet the profession’s
standards, to provide service at least as good
as that of competitors and to meet its own
ideals of quality practice, the partners take
measures they consider helpful. They do this
with little fanfare but often at considerable
cost and strain. The motivation for private
regulation comes from within a firm; the regu
latory measures are applied within the firm;
the benefit from those measures flows directly
to the firm and its clients. Private regulation—
the personal response to a variety of stimuli—
constitutes the ultimate means by which all
constructive improvement is effected.

Interrelationship of the
Levels of Regulation
The three levels of regulation are complemen
tary rather than competitive. None can substi
tute for another; none is adequate by itself.
Without the legal powers and authority of
government regulation, peer or private regula
tion cannot seek out and punish wrongdoers
with the effectiveness and justice of public
regulation. Nor can government regulation
provide the educational benefits of peer regu
lation or reach out to the numbers affected by
private regulation. If those who use the ser
vices of public accountants are to have the full
benefits of regulation in all its forms, all three
levels o f regulation must be encouraged and
strengthened.
Some critics o f the current system appear to
argue that the most effective discipline is
quick, sure and dramatic punishment. They
believe that if failure to perform in accordance
with requirements is discovered and pun
ished, quality performance by other practi
tioners will result. I would not argue that
crime should not be punished, but there is a
great deal more to regulation than the punish
ment o f crime. Do we want the practice of
accounting to remain at the minimum level

that society will tolerate, or do we expect pro
fessional practice to be carried out at a much
higher level o f service? If the latter is the case,
we must have the means to teach that require
ment to all who are expected to meet it.

The Benefits of Peer Review
Those who believe so strongly in punishment
should have the experience of sitting in on an
exit conference following a peer review. A l
most without fail there is an interesting ex
change o f useful ideas, as well as promises to
forward copies o f guides and checklists that
the reviewing team has found helpful in its
practice and that the reviewed firm is eager to
receive and use. For every intentional law
breaker in accounting, there are thousands of
dedicated practitioners eager to improve the
quality of their work. Peer review, an aspect
o f peer regulation, is a remarkably successful
educational process. By establishing profes
sional standards for quality control and then
testing firms’ compliance with those stan
dards, peer regulation teaches the nature of
quality control to all who are reviewed. In
addition, it carries to firm after firm word of
what other firms are doing to measure up to
those quality control standards as efficiently
and effectively as possible.
In addition to the educational function of
peer review, there is some highly desirable
discipline. In anticipation of a peer review, a
firm must document its quality control for the
reviewers. Development o f this document
necessarily turns the firm’s attention inward,
toward its quality control policies and proce
dures. Management must ask, “ Exactly what
are we doing— and not doing— to maintain
the quality of control over all aspects of our
professional activities that our peers will ex
pect o f us?”
Members o f the review team use this docu
ment in two ways. First, they ascertain wheth
er the standards claimed meet the quality con
trol standards of the profession. Second, they
scrutinize evidential matter indicative of the
firm’s policies and the implementation of
those policies to discover the extent to which
the firm adheres to the quality control stan
dards alleged to constitute its practice. The
discovery by the reviewers of any material
failure to perform in compliance with the
Firm’s own quality control document results in
a specific description o f the failure. The facts
o f the description are cleared with the partner
or the responsible staff member of the re
viewed firm, and the description is included in
the peer review work papers along with the
firm’s response to the charge of a deficiency
in its quality control.

The Question of Sanctions
Now we come to the matter of sanctions, or
punishments. The “ Organizational Structure
and Functions o f the SEC Practice Section of
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Exhibit I/continued
the AICPA Division for CPA Firms” grants
to the executive committee the authority to
impose sanctions on member firms following
appropriate disciplinary proceedings.1 These
sanctions include
□ ” [Requiring| corrective measures by the
firm including consideration by the firm of
appropriate actions with respect to individual
firm personnel.
□ “ Additional requirements for continuing
professional education.
□ “ Accelerated or special peer reviews.
□ “ Admonishments, censures, or reprimands.
□ “ Monetary fines.
□ “ Suspension from membership.
□ “ Expulsion from membership."2
To date, no official sanction has been im
posed by the executive committee on any
member of the SECPS. This fact has caused
some criticism by those who consider govern
ment regulation to be the model for all regula
tory efforts.
Their views have been expressed to me in
these general terms: “ A regulatory pro
gram— call it self-regulation or whatever you
will— that does not impose sanctions has no
credibility. Not only must sanctions be im
posed, their imposition must be a matter of
public knowledge, and they must be suffi
ciently severe to be impressive. Your system
must have teeth in it, or it will have no public

“Public accounting firms know a great
deal about sanctions; they apply
them on a private basis promptly,
effectively and as often as needed.”
standing.” These are contentions that require
consideration.
Although the executive committee is the
only body that has the authority to impose
sanctions officially, in fact the equivalent of
sanctions is already being proposed by others
at a number of points in the system and volun
tarily accepted by the firms to which pro
posed.
When a peer review is completed, the for
mal report on the review, prepared by the
team captain, is forwarded by the reviewed
firm to the peer review committee for accep
tance and inclusion with accompanying pa
pers in the public file. With the formal report,
the peer review committee receives a copy of
the letter of comment, which mentions all de
ficiencies in quality control not cleared during
the review, as well as the firm’s response to
each of them. If the peer review committee is
not satisfied with the report, the letter of com1American Institute of CPAs Division for CPA Firms. SEC
Practice Section. “ Organizational Structure and Functions of
the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA
Firms” (sec. 1), SECPS Manual, rev. ed. (New York:
AICPA, 1983).
2Ibid.. p. 1-15.
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ment or the firm’s responses, it will refuse to
accept the report until an appropriate response
or modification has been made. In some in
stances this “ appropriate response,” in the
view o f the peer review committee, is the
equivalent of a sanction. Let me offer some
examples:
□ In the 1980 peer review of firm A, two
engagements were considered by the review
ers to be non-GAAS and the audit work papers
were seriously deficient in documentation.
Both engagements were in specialized indus
tries. The engagement partner, who is also the
firm’s managing partner, was judged to be
technically deficient in accounting and audit
ing matters. The peer review committee in
sisted that the firm adopt additional quality
control procedures to monitor the perfor
mance of the managing partner when he
served as an audit engagement partner. His
partners concluded that another form of cor
rective action was preferable, and the peer
review committee agreed. The firm relieved
the managing partner o f all engagement re
sponsibilities; he is now concerned only with
administrative matters.
□ In the course o f the 1980 peer review of
firm B, seriously deficient engagements were
identified in a branch office managed by a
manager without adequate partner oversight.
In its letter o f response the firm reported that
the manager had been transferred to another
office and a technically proficient partner had
been assigned to manage the branch office in
question. The peer review committee found
these measures satisfactory.
□ The 1981 peer review o f firm C concluded
that a construction-company audit engage
ment had been performed in a substandard
way. The peer review committee agreed to
accept the firm’s peer review report on the
condition that the firm agree to have a fullscope review o f the engagement by someone
with adequate knowledge of the industry be
fore issuance of the report.
□ Firm D received an adverse report on its
1980 peer review. The peer review committee
required the firm to undergo another full peer
review within two years rather than the nor
mal three-year term required by the member
ship rules. The 1982 report was a modified
one. Serious engagement deficiencies were
found in both the 1980 and 1982 reviews. The
peer review committee required the firm to
subject the specific engagements in question
to an on-site review by a member o f the peer
review committee. The reviewing member
recommended, and the full committee con
curred, that, as a condition o f continuing
membership, the firm had to engage the ser
vices o f an outside consultant (1) to perform
reviews o f all audits before issuance o f audit
reports and (2) to oversee the firm’s annual
inspection program. Correspondence on these
matters is in the public file.

Similar activities are part of the work of the
special investigations committee (SIC):
□ In one SIC investigation the review of an
office found that, although no engagement
was judged an audit failure, several sets of
audit work papers were considered to be mate
rially deficient in documentation. In the
course of the investigation, and working in
conjunction with selected members of the
SIC, the firm developed a corrective action
plan for that office. The plan contained three
major provisions: (1) partners from another
office will do a preissuance review of reports
and audit work papers o f all audit engage
ments (non-SEC engagements as well as SEC
engagements) of the office in question, (2) the
assigned preissuance reviewers will partici
pate in the development and approval of the
audit plan for each engagement and (3) sever
al partners in the office were relieved of audit
responsibilities.
□ In another case the SIC discovered,
through inquiry, that the partner assigned to
perform a preissuance review on an audit of an
SEC client had not performed that review on a
timely basis. As a result, the noncompliance
o f the offending partner was brought to the
attention of the firm’s top management, and
the firm issued a strongly worded written re
minder to all partners on the importance of
complying with the firm's and the SECPS's
requirements of a concurring partner preis
suance review on all SEC engagements— an
effective indirect, if not direct, reprimand.
The sanctions described are actual, yet they
represent a small proportion of the total issued
within the less visible portions of our entire
regulatory effort. In participating in the re
views of some of the first investigations per
formed under the SIC's direction, the POB
learned that by the time the SIC investigation
had begun, the firms involved had already
completed internal inquiries of their own and
had taken action that sometimes included
transferring partners and managers to less re
sponsible positions and bringing in others to
replace them.
Those who conceive of a public accounting
firm as straining to protect an inept or dishon
est partner or manager should think again.
Self-interest on the part of the members of the
firm demands that the incompetent, the care
less and the venal be removed from any posi
tion in which they can expose the firm to
harm. Public accounting firms know a great
deal about sanctions; they apply them on a
private basis promptly, effectively and as of
ten as needed.
Consider the plight of a partner who has
been terminated for reasons of unsatisfactory
performance. He has been found inadequate
by his most intimate peers. Accepted by them
into professional partnership— with all that
implies— he has been judged unworthy of that
trust. His opportunity for finding employment

at anything like his previous compensation is
slight, indeed. He may not be in jail, but he
has been punished severely and is an object
lesson to all who comprehend the nature and
severity of his former partners' action.
Similar sanctions have been imposed at the
level of private regulation as a direct result
of peer review, without ever getting to the
peer review committee or the SIC. The peer
review process has brought home to member
firms of all sizes the importance of quality
control and the nature of the measures re
quired to maintain it. In recent discussions
with a peer review team leader who had per
formed a number of such reviews of small
firms, he responded to the POB’s questions by
citing several cases in which reviewed firms
had taken quick action to strengthen the qual
ity of their organizations once deficiencies
had been pointed out. One case involved the
partner in charge of quality control in the re
viewed firm. The peer review established that
he had little understanding of, or respect for.
quality control. When this fact was pointed
out to the managing partner, together with
data in support of that contention, the man
was removed from his position immediately.
The partner who discussed this case noted
several other examples, including some in his
own firm. Peer review, in his judgment,
which is based on direct experience in his own
firm and elsewhere, is an effective force for
improving the quality of professional practice
in those firms that take advantage of it.

The Issue of Confidentiality
Some of the profession’s critics would say
that for all intents and purposes the illustra
tions provided thus far are nonpublic— that is,
no one knows about them because they have
not been publicized. They contend that sanc
tions must be publicized to carry the message
that the AICPA self-regulatory program is
credible. There is truth in the assertion that the
discipline described gains little public atten
tion; whether that denies its usefulness in es
tablishing credibility is an assertion without
supporting evidence.

There are reasons for confidentiality, but
the issue of confidentiality is a complex one,
involving private rights, the public interest,
the litigious nature of our society and a wide
spread misunderstanding of the role, rights
and responsibilities of independent accoun
tants serving in their capacity as auditors. The
resolution of so fundamental an issue, compli
cated as it is by so many factors, should not be
attempted here.
My expectation is that, by the time the next
POB annual report is issued, some means will
have been found, either in that report or else
where, to disclose the extent and nature of the
disciplinary actions im posed within the
AICPA program.

The Public Image Problem
The public image of auditing suffers greatly
from a combination of circumstances. The
first is the tendency to believe the worst of our
fellow s, especially if there is litigation involv
ing an alleged audit failure. Time after time, I
have observed that the latest allegations pub
lished in the Wall Street Journal or elsewhere
were being accepted at face value. Later de
velopments supplied information that altered
the conclusions substantially. Second is the
equally human tendency to seek someone to
blame for our mistakes. An investment that
goes wrong must be the fault of someone
else— hence the innumerable suits against
auditors. It is no wonder that a technically
proficient screening of such cases by the SIC
finds so high a proportion of them to have no
merit.
Third, few people understand the auditor’s
role with respect to financial statements and
business success. They ask, “ If an auditor
says everything is all right, how could the
company possibly fail?’’ But accountants
know that, although a business failure may
include an accounting failure, it seldom does.
The profession should be prepared to make
that point over and over. In today’s economy a
change in a company’s fortune can have disas
trous effects in a short time, often since the
date o f the most recent audit report.

As knowledgeable business people and ac
countants, we should be slow to charge audit
deficiencies until all the evidence is in. When
in the company o f those who are quick to do
so, we should point out the weakness of their
position. With peer review working as it is,
few if any auditors will commence or com 
plete an engagement with the intention of do
ing unsatisfactory work. Our task is not to
protect the guilty, but if accountants are inter
ested in a satisfactory public image of their
profession, they must be prepared to reserve
judgment until all the facts are in and should
encourage others to do the same.

Conclusion
Recently a member of the AICPA board of
directors asked me whether the POB had any
objective measurement of the success of the
self-regulatory program. He had nothing spe
cific in mind but was thinking in terms of a
lessening of the number o f cases litigated year
after year since the program started. My an
swer had to be that we did not have such a
measure and that I didn’t believe we ever
would. There are so many uncontrollable and
perhaps even unknown factors impinging on
the amount of litigation against accountants
that I don’t believe we can ever isolate and
measure the specific impact of the AICPA
program.
But that does not mean it has had no impact
or will have no impact. Conceptually, the
AICPA program is unique, far reaching and
impressive. Practically, it is serving its pur
pose well. The practice o f public accounting
in this country is improved day by day as
peers review the professional performance of
practicing accountants, hold them to compli
ance with high standards, exchange views on
additional improvements and report failures.
It is still a young program and has a way to go
before anyone will concede it is beyond im
provement. The POB will continue to listen to
critics and try to evaluate their comments. We
will also take some modest pride in a program
that is sound, in place and working well. ■
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Exhibit II

Public Oversight Board
Member

Term Expires
December 31

Affiliation

Arthur M. Wood
Chairman*

1985

Former chairman and chief executive
officer of Sears, Roebuck & Co.

John D. Harper

1985

Former chairman of Communications
Satellite Corporation and former
chairman and chief executive officer
of Aluminum Company of America

Robert K. Mautz

1984

Professor of Accounting, University
of Michigan

A. A. Sommer, Jr.

1984

Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
Washington, D.C., and former SEC
commissioner

Richard A. Stark

Legal Counsel
to the Board

Partner, Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy, New York

Permanent S ta ff

Louis W. Matusiak
Charles J. Evers
Alan H. Feldman
Marcia E. Brown
Miriam Freilich

Executive Director and Secretary
Technical Director
Assistant Technical Director
Administrative Assistant
Secretary

John J. McCloy, a partner in Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy served as chairman until his resignation for personal reasons in February 1984.
In August 1984, Melvin R. Laird, former Secretary o f Defense, was appointed to the Board to fill the vacancy created by Mr. McCloy’s
resignation.
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SEC Practice Section
E xecutive Committee
M em ber

John W. Zick, Chairman
John D. Abernathy, III
George L. Bernstein
Robert M. Coffman
J. Michael Cook
Mario J. Formichella
James D. Glauser
Clifford E. Graese
Howard Groveman
Charles Kaiser, Jr.
Robert L. May
J. Curt Mingle
J. David Moxley
Robert D. Neary
Richard W. Paddock
James J. Quinn
Edward A. Reinerio
John A. Thompson
Jack C. Wahlig
Michael A. Walker
Donald P. Zima

F ir m A f f i l i a t i o n

*Price Waterhouse
*Seidman & Seidman
*Laventhol & Horwath
*Fox & Company
*Deloitte Haskins & Sells
*Arthur Young & Company
Baird, Kurtz & Dobson
*Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
*Alexander Grant & Company
Pannell Kerr Forster
*Arthur Andersen & Co.
Clifton Gunderson & Co.
*Touche Ross & Co.
*Ernst & Whinney
Battelle & Battelle
*Coopers & Lybrand
Johnson Grant & Co.
*Main Hurdman
*McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen
Mann Judd Landau
May Zima & Co.

Firm entitled to permanent seat because firm audits 30 or more registrants under section 12 o f the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

Peer Review Committee

Edward J. O’Grady, Chairman
Thomas E. Byrne, Sr.
Michael L. Conway
Arthur I. Farber
Marvin Feller
Robert E. Fleming
Robert H. Haas
John G. F. Knight
Daniel J. Moylan
David A. Nelson
Joseph A. Puglisi
Robert H. Temkin
Frank H. Whitehand
Jerry E. Whitehorn
Prentice N. Ursery

Laventhol & Horwath
Price Waterhouse
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Altschuler, Melvoin & Glasser
Ernst & Whinney
Fleming, Tempas & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand
Purvis, Gray and Company
Deloitte Haskins & Sells
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen
Touche Ross & Co.
Arthur Young & Company
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Whitehorn, Bradsher & Tankersley
Pannell Kerr Forster

Special Investigations Committee

Robert A. Mellin, Chairman
Mark J. Feingold
*Edwin P. Fisher
*JohnJ. Fox
Gerald E. Gorans
*Leroy Layton
*Leon P. Otkiss
*David Wentworth
Joseph A. Zulfer

Hood and Strong
Laventhol & Horwath
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand
Touche Ross & Co.
Main Hurdman
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen
Ernst & Whinney

*
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